Abstract-In this paper, we provide a comprehensive study of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for wireless sensor networks (WSN) security provisioning, mainly for key management and authentication modules. On the other hand, we present and evaluate a side-channel attacks (SCAs) experimental bench solution for energy evaluation, especially simple power analysis (SPA) attacks experimental bench to measure dynamic power consumption of ECC operations. The goal is the best use of the already installed SCAs experimental bench by performing the robustness test of ECC devices against SPA as well as the estimate of its energy and dynamic power consumption. Both operations are tested: point multiplication over Koblitz curves and doubling points over binary curves, with respectively affine and projective coordinates. The experimental results and its comparison with simulation ones are presented. They can lead to accurate power evaluation with the maximum reached error less than 30%.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORKS
A DVANCED technology in wireless communication and microelectronics allow today to build wireless sensor nodes. It's small, inexpensive, and battery powered sensing devices. The set build WSN is exploited for divers services as habitat monitoring [1] , structural health monitoring [2] , emergency medical care [3] , health care [4] , vehicular tracking [5] and even military operations [6] . WSNs are, in general, more vulnerable to attack and unauthorized access that can be easily compromised than wired networks. Indeed, security is fundamental for this type of applications mainly if WSN is deployed in security-critical applications as hostile environments. A more specific, authentication and key management to derive shared secret keys are the two most essential security services to maintain the proper operation for these applications. To ensure these services, WSN use two families of cryptographic symmetric (shared-key cryptography) and asymmetric (public-key cryptography) algorithms . The former, despite these advantages that its low-resource requirements, it has some drawback: inflexible from key distribution as they require pre-distribution of keys, not robust by using one global key that lost its would compromise security on the entire network and problems of keys's storage. The last can be used to solve these problems. It allows for flexible key management and authentication by session key distribution and digital signature. ECC public-key cryptosystem compared with RSA [7] offers equivalent security at much smaller key sizes. It reduces computation time and also the amount of data transmitted and stored. Thereafter, using ECC leads to more performance to WSN devices that are often limited in terms of energy [8] , clock frequency, and memory size [9] . To more overcome these constraints, all efforts have been aimed on providing hardware solution to ECC in order to create simple and energy-efficient cryptographic hardware designs [10] . However, integration of ECC hardware designs in WSN requires energy and security test in advance, mainly if these nodes are deployed in hostile environments. Energy test, that is energy estimation, is needed to measure devices's survival for the purpose of knowing its autonomy. Security test is designed for achieve higher robustness against threats. The ECC hardware deseign may be threatened by its physical behavior. This type of threats is called side channel attacks (SCA) [11] . Simple power analysis (SPA) [12] is one of the good examples. It analyses device's power consumption during operation. SCAs-based SPA uses possible correlations between internal secret data (e.g. keys) and information leakage of an instantaneous power while in excution. Robustness test of ECC devices against SPA can be used to estimate its energy or power consumption. Hence, making the best use of SCA experimental bench which based on SASEBO (Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board). Severals studies have been reported in the area of side-channel attacks with SASEBO [13] - [16] that has been originally developed for power analysis attacks. These studies are based on the measurement of power consumption design precisely its dynamic part. Due to the fact that only dynamic power variation is information leakage for SPA par excellence, static power will not be taken into considenration in this work, since it's not affected by design activity. The measurement approach of power consumption which is alternative experiment based on measured current supplied leads to very accurate power results. Its Drawbacks as very high cost and delay due to design fabrication will be overcome by the already installed SCA experimental bench. Other approach for power consumption estimation is the simulation which uses models relating power consumption and programming instructions. It is based on few such tools designed for commercial FPGAs,and the most widely used are XPower from Xilinx [17] and PowerPlay from Altera [18] . Nevertheless,large errors are detected when the estimates obtained from these tools have been compared to physical measurements. As a result,it is preferred that the power estimation models are characterized by on-board measurements. Related work in the area of power estimation is extensive enough. Only the nearest ones of our proposal are presented here i.e., power estimation of security algorithms applications. Tisserand [19] proposed activity evaluation method that leads to accurate power estimations (less than 20% difference compared to Spice simulations) and very fast estimation times (about 100 speedup factor). This method has been validated on ECC arithmetic operators (adders and basic multipliers). It uses useful activity evaluation based on circuit emulation on FPGA and glitching activity estimation using a formal model. For FPGA emulation , an activity counters are inserted into the low-level description of the evaluated digital circuits (arithmetic operators) to count the number of useful activity. This process would be too complicated. In [20] ,although the board is not specifically designed for experiments, the authors have presented and compares the estimated and measured power consumption of security algorithms on both Xilinx and Altera FPGAs. Alteras PowerPlay power estimation tool generated more accurate results than Xilinxs XPower tool. Compared to measured power consumption, estimating tools is uncapable to produce the accurate results needed by the designers of the security hardware-based modules. In [21] , Mane and Schaumont measured the energy characteristic of an RFID doing ECDSA key generation, signature generation and signature verification for a microcontroller target. They analyzed and quantified, for two different security levels, the impact of several architecture optimization techniques including voltage scaling, frequency scaling, and the use of a hardware multiplier. In our experiments, we used the SASEBO board, specifically designed for experiments, for power consumption evaluation of ECC operations based on current supplied measurements of processing hardware block. Both operations are tested: point multiplication over Koblitz curves and doubling points over binary curves, with respectively affine and projective coordinates. In order to verify correctness of our proposal, we have compared it with the estimation results from low-level simulation by Xilinxs XPower tool. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give a brief introduction about ECC and power/energy approximation. Section 3 describes ECC security services for WSN such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key generation [22] and ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) [23] . Section 4 presents a experimental bench that can be used for energy measurements of ECC operations. The result of hardware implementation and mesured energy 
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first give a brief introduction about ECC, followed by the description of Activity and Power/Energy Approximation, which will be useful to understand the remainder.
A. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
In this subsection, we'll to explain the ECC. Reference [24] gives more information. ECC is a kind of publickey cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields [24] . It uses smaller key sizes without degradation of security level (as shown in table I). For example, a 256 bits key in ECC provides the same security level as a 3072 bits RSA key. The smaller key size lead to less space for key storage, time saving when key is transmitted and less costly arithmetic computations. These characteristics make ECC the best choice for low-bandwidth communication, low-storage and low-computation environments as well as wireless networks. Elliptic curves are typically defined over two types of finite fields: binary extension fields F m 2 and prime fields F p where p is a large prime number. For fast hardware implementations, binary finite fields F m 2 with polynomial arithmetic are better preferred because some arithmetic operations are easier to compute, like addition which is an XOR operation and the elements are binary strings that are well represented in m-bit registers. An elliptic curve over F m 2 is defined by a cubic equation
2 . An elliptic curve over F m 2 consists of the set of points with pairs of affine coordinates (x,y) for x, y ∈ F m 2 that satisfy an equation of the above form and an infinity point O. The set of points form an additive group with O as an identity element. For any point P on an elliptic curve, the set O,P,2P,3P, ... is a cyclic group [24] . With an integer K, K.P is called scalar multiplication. It is the computationally expensive operation. Knowing the scalar K and the point P, K.P is relatively easy to compute. On the contrary, Knowing P and K.P and to find scalar K, is computationally infeasible . It is a problem with exponential complexity, called Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECLDP) that determines security of ECC. The hardness of ECDLP allows several cryptographic schemes [25] , Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme [22] and the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [26] . ECC have a layered hierarchy as a pyramid as shown in figure  1 . Scalar multiplication is a consecutive sum of points that can be performed using point addition and point doubling. The former consists of the sum of two different points (P + Q). The earlier corresponds to the sum of the same point (2.P=P + P). To compute this fundamental operation, double-and-Add algorithm or binary algorithm is the most classic way used. The scalar K is represented with binary expansion, a point doubling is performed for each bit but point addition is done if bit equals "1".It is known that the computational cost of the doubleand-add algorithm is m − 1 point doublings plus an average of m − 1 2 point additions.These two operations are based on finite field operators. For binary field F m 2 with polynomial basis (PB), field elements are represented as polynomials of degree at most m-1. Addition operator is a bitwise exclusive-or (XOR), which is performed as an addition of polynomials modulo 2. Multiplication operator and its particular case with the same operands, square, are performed modulo an irreducible polynomial. Inversion is the most expensive field operation with affine coordinate representation (x,y). Speeding elliptic curve scalar multiplication operations can be with optimization techniques such as using projective coordinate systems (X,Y,Z) [24] and subfield binary curves with a ∈ 0, 1 and b = 1 which are Koblitez curves, denoted by K-m or E k [27] . The former represents the affine point (X/Z, Y/Z) to avoid costly inversion. The earlier with Frobenius maps τ operation defined over E k allows to substitute point doubling with only 2 squarings; 2P = −τ 2 P + µ.τ.P , where µ = 1 or−1 and τ (x, y) = (x 2 , y 2 ).
B. Power/Energy Approximation
For digital circuits, leakage and activity (signal transitions) are behind the static and dynamic power consumption respectively [28] . Relative to the complete power dissipation static power is typically only a small portion. Knowledge of the dynamic power gives an overall idea about consumption of a circuit. Physically, it's caused by short-circuit currents and charging and discharging load/parasitic capacitances. Functionally, it strongly depends on data values and the time of executed operations. In the other hand the measure of dynamic power variations as information leakage is used in simple power attacks (SPA). The purpose is to find correlation between useful information (keys) and information leakage related to instantaneous power of the executed operations [28] . As in figure 2 an oscilloscope measures current supplied to device as well as the power consumption of the main power supply for the circuit. It is possible to measure the instantaneous power consumption of the device during the runtime of a cryptographic operation. The dynamic power consumption at the internal power nets is directly affected by the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operation executed on the circuit. The precise data is gained digitally from oscilloscope. This instantaneous power at time t is P DD (t) = i DD (t) * V DD , V DD is fixed power supply of a circuit and i DD (t) is instantaneous current that measured from voltage across Shunt resistor (1Ω) placed between power supply (1.6V ) and the circuit. Hence, the Cryptographic attacks setup to test the robustness of such a circuit against the power analysis based side channel attacks can be operated to estimate energy or power consumption based on the trace of instantaneous current. Assuming that consumed power by the shunt resistor is negligible, since it's typically only a small portion of the complete power dissipation. The average consumed dynamic power by FPGA circuit is then computed as a product of the power supply and the average current going through the resistance. To calculate the consumed dynamic power P DD (1) and energy activity W (2) , we do the following calculations:
The RMS (Root Mean Square) is a value for a voltage or current that an equally great power in a resistance dissipates as a DC voltage or current with the same value. the RMS voltage V RM S (3) is calculated of the voltage as a function of time v(t). The equation 4 calculates the RMS current I RM S with the current as a function of time i(t).
III. ECC-BASED SECURITY SERVICES FOR WSN
As mentioned below WSN security systems based on symmetric-key algorithms is not perfect for all security issues, mainly in key management procedure and authentication services. These functionalities require asymmetric [27] . Key management for pair-wise key is used to secure unicast communication between two nodes in the network. Authentication service including the following three phases: identifing user and verifing thats allowed to access some restricted services, identifying node or verifing its identity and proving that data is fresh and unchanged from the source. ECC public key resolves key management and authentication problems with respectively ECDH key exchange and ECDSA.
A. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman is a widely standardized variant of the classical Diffie-Hellman by the combination of ECC with this apprauch [29] . It allows providing key exchange scheme for two communication nodes in WSNs. It's most effective for pair-wise keying only with every direct neighbor. These main advantages are perfect resilience to node capture, excellent scalability, and low storage memory as well as communication overhead that does not need any trusted third party (trusted authority). It does not require a pre-distribution of keying material, and hence it also works for entities which have never met in advance or do not possess a secret key with a trusted third party. ECDH scheme between two nodes works as shown in the figure 3. Node A and node B generate their public keys by multiplying agree point P with their private keys K A and K B . After exchange public keys between them , they generate a shared secret key by multiplying public keys by their private keys. The secret key is R = K B * K A * P . Finding the private keys K B and K A by an eavesdropper with public values of Q A , Q B and P is computationally intractable. The problem of ECDH key exchange does not authenticate the entities A and B, and is therefore vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [30] . It needs ECDSA to reform this weakness.
B. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDSA is a variant of Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), which uses ECC [23] . As application ECDSA allows WSN authentication entities to resolve the weakness of ECDH [30] and authenticating broadcasted packets especially as in WSN broadcast is the fundamental communication primitive [31] . Broadcast authentication implicitly provides two additional cryptographic services that are data integrity and non-repudiation of the signed message . Data integrity service allows the prevention of data alteration by using secure hash algorithm (SHA) [32] . Non-repudiation of sensor data is achieved by generating ECDSA on the sensor devices to ensure that a transaction cannot be denied. In comparison with asymmetric-key algorithms, µ Tesla [33] , symmetric-key algorithms, is a lightweight cryptographic primitive designed for efficient authentication of broadcast messages in WSNs. It does not support non-repudiation of sensor data [34] . It need for time synchronization and the delayed authentication, it has made them vulnerable to a variety of attacks [35] - [37] . Moreover, scalability is another concern for symmetrickey based solutions [35] . ECDSA is used in WSN for several scenarios: from base station to all sensor nodes or to new node, from the user to several nodes and between nodes [29] . Its principal version is generated in two steps there are detailled below; the first is generated by the sender and called signature generation and the second is generated by the receiver and called signature verification. This version of signature is carried out only after system initialization wherein each entity has its trusted private and public key respectively d and Q = d * P .
• Signature generation; To sign the message, the signer: 1) Chooses an integer k from [1, n − 1]; 2) Computes k.P = (x 1 , y 1 ); 3) Computes r = x 1 mod n; 4) Computes e = h(m) m the message, e the message digest and h the hash function;
The signature is the set (r, s). This step needs a pseudo random number generator to choose k, one point multiplication, one modular reduction, one hash function, addition and modular division.
• Signature verification To verify the signature, the receiver: 1) Computes e = h(m); 2) Computes u 1 = e.s −1 mod n; 3) Computes u 2 = r.s −1 mod n; 4) Computes u 1 .P + u 2 .Q = (x 2 , y 2 ); 5) Computes v = x 2 mod n;
The receiver must compare v and r. If v = r, then the signature is valid else it is invalid. The demonstration is as follows:
Since
. As a result u 1 .P + u 2 .Q = k.P . Consequently (x 2 , y 2 ) = (x 1 , y 1 ). Therefore, x 2 mod n = x 1 mod n. Which gives that the signature is well verified v = r. This step needs one hash function, two modular divisions, two point multiplications, one point addition and one modular reduction.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL BENCH DESCRIPTION
The Experimental bench is developed mainly for physical attacks researches precisely for Side-channel Attack. It's based on Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board version G (SASEBO-G). It 's designed to develop standard evaluation schemes to secure the cryptographic module against physical attacks by comparing different attack algorithms and the efficiency of countermeasures. SASEBO-G board allows for taking such specific measurements with use of Tektronix CT1 current probe and Lecroy Waverunner 104Xi-a oscilloscope which has a USB port in order to record data digitally. The measurement station is controlled by HP Z800 computing server. To ease the measurements, the board is supplied from low noise HP E3610A power supply ( figure 4) .
The SASEBO-G board requires a power supply of 3.3 V DC at 1.0 Amps. It equips two Xilinx Virtex-II Pro series FPGAs; Cryptographic FPGA: xc2vp7-fg456-5 to implement useful cryptographic module and Control FPGA: xc2vp30-fg676-5 to implement control module as frequency divider. These two targets work with 24 MHz frequency and 1.6V DC powers after regulation. The measurement of the power consumption of the FPGAs in order to test the robustness against simple power attacks as well as energy evaluation is based in voltage drop traces via Shunt resistors that can be inserted into V DD and GND lines of the board. Figure 5 depicts the hardware implementation architecture of elliptic curves operations, which are point multiplication over Koblitz curves and point doubling with respectively affine and projective coordinates in Cryptographic FPGA. This architecture is composed by memory bloc (BRAM), ECC operations and controller. It is necessary to perform numerous tests for the same ECC operation with severals random values operands. The aim is to find average energy value from average traces. BRAM is used to storage input data: coordinates of points and the scalar K with standard size m = 163 bits. The controller allows to orchestrate the cryptoprocessor. It controls BRAM by adr, W and R signals which are used respectively for addressing memory, write and reader order. ECC operations block is controlled via start and done signals. The total design is activated manually by In order to finally evaluate obtained power consumption results the instantaneous current consumed by the device performing ECC operations was measured. We have measured current supplied to the Virtex-II Pro device mounted on SASEBO-G. Indeed voltage drop traces that are proportional to the power consumption are measured via Shunt resistors of 1Ω value which provides the instantaneous current i(t) by using Ohm's law (U = R * I). Hence the waveforms of Voltage drop and i(t) are similar, which makes it possible to compute the I RM S and consequently the average dynamic power also the dynamic energy. Figures 6 (left) shows the respective voltage drop waveforms associated to point multiplication over Koblitz curves with 54138 cycles latency. One may observe that there is a high peak at the beginning of this operation. The peak occurs due to the initialisation phase and loading of new operands values. Figures 6 (right) indicates an extract for elementary operations of point multiplication such as points additions and squares operations. The variations of the useful activity during a elementary operations have a very specific decreasing step-wave shape. It can be used as simple power attacks. Knowing the representations of elementary operations, this type of traces allows the attacker to acknowledge the binary composition of the key K and thus to reveal the secret. For more security The solution is to modify the algorithm and the architecture in such a way that single points additions and squares cannot be too easily distinguished [38] . Measurement results for a sequence of point doubling operations, with each one 333 cycles latency, using random values operands are presented in Figure 7 (left) with an extract of a average traces representative of these point doubling (right). The reported measurements are shown to find average energy value. all random operands lead to the similar overall shape. since We have noticed that dependency of the shape of activity variation curves on input data is rather low. 
V. EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS ANALYSIS

VI. POWER ESTIMATION AND COMPARAISON
In order to justify the exprmental power measurements, we have compared it with the estimation results from low-level simulation by Xilinxs XPower tool. XPower tool calculate the consumed energy based on the fact that the dynamic power consumption inside an FPGA circuit is mainly caused by its switching activity. The information about every elements activity rate was taken from the VCD-file. It is the result of runnig the Modelsim simulation of the placed-and-routed design. The estimation values computed by XPower tool, when executing the exact same experimental bench as the one applied in our experiments accordingly, are demonstrated on table IV. Average dynamic power is 463 mW for the point multiplication and 42 mW for the point doubling. Estimated energy consumption for the first operation is 1.044 mJ and 0.54 * 10 −3 mJ for the second one. Divide the difference between estimated and the measured values with the estimated value (8), will get the percentage of the error between the measured and the estimated value of each operations. Table IV report a comparison between the XPower-estimated dynamic power and our experimenal-measered dynamic power. The maximum reached average error is equal to 29,5% for point multiplication over Koblitz curves and 26.2% for doubling points over binary curves. The difference is less than 30% compared to XPower simulations. Hence experimenal dynamic power measurements leads to accurate dynamic power estimations. Consequently, experimental bench of cryptographic circuit against the power analysis based side channel attacks can be an accurate tool for dynamic power measurements.
Error(%) = P dyn (XP ower) − P dyn (measured) P dyn (XP ower)
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied ECC-based security services for WSN. ECC is an appropriate, and viable, choice for WSN. It resolves key management and authentication problems with respectively ECDH key exchange and ECDSA. On the other hand, we have presented the SPA experimental bench as an alternative for energy evaluation. It serves as accurate tool for dynamic power measurement. Furthermore, a designer can use it to analyze a greater number of cryptographic design architectures to find the lowest power consumption candidates for WSN devices. Both operations are tested: point multiplication over Koblitz curves and doubling points over binary curves, with respectively affine and projective coordinates. We have validated our approche with estimation results from low-level simulation by Xilinxs XPower tool. As a future work we will study the energy of others operations of ECC with the same solution but more complicated as ECDSA and ECDH. The overall objective is adequacy test of these primiteves for wireless sensor network applications.
